I Will Vote for President Trump in 2020 Again

As we saw in 2016 and once more in 2020, traditional survey research is finding information technology harder than it in one case was to appraise presidential elections accurately. Pre-ballot polls systemically misjudge who is likely to vote, and exit polls conducted as voters leave the voting booths go it wrong as well.

At present, using a massive sample of "validated" voters whose participation has been independently verified, the Pew Research Center has published a detailed analysis of the 2020 presidential election. It helps us sympathize how Joe Biden was able to accomplish what Hillary Clinton did not—and why President Trump came closer to getting reelected than the pre-election surveys had predicted.

How Joe Biden won

Five principal factors business relationship for Biden'south success.

1. The Biden campaign reunited the Democratic Party. Compared to 2016, he raised the share of moderate and conservative Democrats who voted for the Democratic nominee by vi points, from 85 to 91%, while increasing the Democratic share of liberal Democrats from 94 to 98%. And he received the support of 85% of Democrats who had defected to 3^rd party and contained candidates in 2016.
2. Contrary to the fears of some Democrats, Biden maintained solid support among African Americans. Biden received 92% of the Black vote, statistically indistinguishable from Hillary Clinton's 91% in 2016. His support among Black women was never in doubt, just President Trump's alleged entreatment to Blackness men turned out to be illusory. (His share of the Black male vote savage from fourteen% in 2016 to 12% in 2020 while Biden raised the Democrats' share from 81% to 87%.) African Americans confirmed their status as a unique group of voters for whom the contemporary Republican Party holds no discernible entreatment.
3. As his supporters for the Democratic nomination had hoped, Joe Biden appealed to the center of the electorate across party lines. He did ten points meliorate than Hillary Clinton amongst Independents, and he doubled her showing amid moderate and liberal Republicans. He improved on her performance amongst two swing religious groups—Catholics (up v points) and mainline Protestants (up vi). Most important, he raised the Democratic share of suburban voters past 9 points, from 45 to 54%, and among White suburban voters, from 38 to 47%.
4. Biden regained much of the support amid men that Hillary Clinton lost in 2016 while retaining her support amidst women. He won 48% of the male vote, up from Clinton's 41%, and 40% of White men, compared to her 32% share. He expanded Democrats' margin of victory among white college-educated men from 3 to 10 points. He even managed to enhance the Democratic share of the white working-course men's vote—the centre of the Trump coalition–to 31%, versus Clinton's weak 23% showing. By contrast, Biden could do no better than Clinton'due south showing among women overall, and he actually lost ground amid white working-class women.
5. Biden's candidacy continued the shift of educated voters towards the Democratic Political party. Among voters with a B.A. or more than, Biden got 61% of the vote, up from 57% in 2016. This total included 57% of white voters with a higher degree or more, 69% of Latinos, and 92% of African Americans. The shift of educated voters continues the recent blueprint of large differences between more- and less-educated voters. The gap in support for Biden among whites with and without college degrees was 24 points; amongst Hispanics with and without higher degrees, 14 points. By contrast, there was no instruction gap any amid Black voters.

How Trump kept it close

Despite (or possibly because of) non-stop controversy about his policies and personal conduct, President Trump managed to raise his share of the pop vote from 46% in 2016 to 47% in 2020. His core coalition held together, and he fabricated a few new friends.

1. The core coalition. Trump's consistent appeals to his base bore fruit. His campaign for reelection was supported by 94% of Republicans, up from 92% in 2016; past 84% of White evangelical Protestants, upwardly from 77%; and by 65% of rural voters, up from 59%. At the same fourth dimension, he held the support of about two-thirds of whites without college degrees, and his back up amidst white women rose from 47 to 53%.
2. New friends. The irresolute Hispanic vote is maybe the nearly notable feature of the 2020 election. Although many observers believed that Mr. Trump's tough policies at the edge would drive Hispanics away from his candidacy, his share of the Hispanic vote jumped by x points, from 28 to 38%. This increase accounts for a portion of the gains he made among urban voters, his share of whom increased by 9 points, from 24 to 33%. In some other surprise, his back up among young adults ages eighteen to 29 improved by vii points, from 28 to 35%.

Longer-term prospects

With electoral mobilization at a elevation for supporters of both political parties, turnout surged to its highest level in a century. The Democratic vote full increased by 15.4 one thousand thousand over 2016; the Republican total, past xi.ii million. In future elections, much volition depend on whether mobilization is symmetrical, as it was in 2020, or asymmetrical, as information technology is when ane party is enthusiastic while the other is discouraged or complacent.

This said, Republicans are facing a structural dilemma. For the most role, their coalition depends on groups—notably whites and voters without college degrees–whose share of the electorate is declining. Moreover, as elderly Americans, who now tend to be supportive of Republican candidates, leave the electorate, they will be replaced by younger cohorts whose views of the Republican Party are far less favorable. Among voters under historic period thirty, Joe Biden enjoyed a margin of 24 points over Donald Trump, and political scientists have constitute the voting patterns formed in this cohort tend to persist.

There are potential countervailing forces, however. If the Democratic Party is regarded as going beyond what the centre of the electorate expects and wants, Democrats' gains amongst suburban voters and moderate Republicans could evaporate. And if Democrats continue to misread the sentiments of Hispanics, who now constitute the country's largest non-white grouping, their shift toward Republicans could keep. At that place is evidence that amidst Hispanics too as whites, a distinctive working-form consciousness is more than powerful than ethnic identity.

As my colleague Elaine Kamarck has observed, Hispanics could turn out to exist the Italians of the 21^st century—family-oriented, hardworking, culturally conservative. If they follow the normal intergenerational immigrant trajectory rather than the distinctive African American path, the multi-indigenous coalition on which Democrats are depending for their political party's future could lose an essential component.

Despite these possibilities, Republicans have made scant progress at the presidential level over the by two decades, during which they gained a popular vote majority but once. In the four most recent elections, their share of the pop vote has varied in a narrow range from a high of 47.ii% in 2012 to a depression of 45.7% in 2008. Despite labelling Manus Romney a "loser," Donald Trump failed to lucifer Romney's share of the popular vote in either 2016 or 2020. Trump'southward gains in some portions of the electorate take been balanced past losses in others. If Republicans cannot move from their current politics of coalition replacement to a new politics of coalition expansion, their prospects of becoming the country'south governing majority are not bright—unless Democrats badly overplay their hand.

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Source: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/07/06/new-2020-voter-data-how-biden-won-how-trump-kept-the-race-close-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future/

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